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WILLIAM 0. DOUGLASt AND GEORGE E. BATEStt
THE blurred fashion in which courts have at times treated the distinc-
tions between stock "brokers" acting on the one hand as agents or on the
other as dealers has resulted in several paradoxical situations. One of
these is illustrated by the procedural and substantive law aspects of
Howell, McArthur & Wiggin, Inc. v. Weinberg.'
Plaintiff, a stock "broker," sued to recover the price of 25 shares of
United Founders Corporation common stock alleged to have been pur-
chased by it "as broker" for and on account of defendants. By a gen-
eral denial and motion to dismiss, defendants raised the point that no
"agency" existed on the part of the plaintiff to purchase for and on ac-
count of defendants but that the transaction constituted a sale to de-
fendants by plaintiff as agent for the seller. That issue was submitted
to the jury which returned a verdict for plaintiff for the price asked
less the commission which the seller allowed plaintiff. The judgment
entered on the verdict was affirmed by the Appellate Division. The
issue before the Court of Appeals was stated as follows: "The sole ques-
tion of law for the consideration of this court is whether this judg-
ment, unanimously affirmed, is supported by any evidence from which
the inference can be drawn that plaintiff acted as agent for defendants." 2
That court, after concluding that the evidence supported the verdict,
affirmed the judgment.
From the record it appears that Founders General Corporation was
distributing stock of its affiliate, United Founders, and had made arrange-
ments with various dealers, including plaintiff, to sell and distribute these
shares under an agreement whereby plaintiff was enabled to obtain the
shares at a price less than the quotation to the customer. The existence
of this arrangement and its details were not controverted nor denied
but were unequivocally established by plaintiff's own witness.3 A re-
tSterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
ttAssistant Professor, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University;
Research Associate on the Sterling Foundation, Yale School of Law.
For a more extended discussion of the security business see the authors' Secondary Dis-
tribution of Securities-Problems Suggested by Kinney v. Glenny (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 949.
1. 260 N. Y. 250, 183 N. E. 379 (1932).
"2. Id. at 252, 183 N. E. at 379.
3. Record, 48, 53. Plaintiff's witness, Walter S. Wiggin, Cross.
Q. Your business was the general buying and selling and dealing in stocks and securi-
ties generally; is that a fact? A. Yes.
Q. And not being a member of any of the stock exchanges you were not bound by
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view of the facts clearly established at the trial indicates that by all known
standards and criteria of the security business ' plaintiff would be classi-
fied as a dealer. (1) Plaintiff was the local sales representative of what
amounted to a wholesaling house. This was established by its admis-
sion at the trial,5 its local advertising," and by the fact that it placed itself
in a class with such well-known security merchants as Harris, Forbes &
Company and Bond & Goodwin.7  (2) It sold to defendants at as nearly
a fixed price as would be possible in such sales of stock." (3) It con-
-firmed the purchase to defendants as "sold to you" rather than as
"bought for your account." 9 (4) It ordered the stock from the whole-
saler without receiving an advance payment or a "margin" from the
customer. 10 (5) It solicited the order for this particular stock,-" thus
indicating it was endeavoring to sell this security, not just soliciting
brokerage business. (6) By its own admission it was bound by the
prices and rules of the wholesaling house.'" (7) It charged its customer
no commission 3 (8) It made no disclosure to the customer of its profit
in the transaction.' (9) It received a dealer's discount from the whole-
their rules, particularly with relation to the commissions you could charge; isn't that a
fact? A. No, we were not bound by the same rules. We were bound by some rules.
Q. Who formulated or promulgated the rules that you were bound by? A. The
Founders General Corporation.
Q. You were their agents and distributors in this section? A. We were one of the
agents and distributors. Harris, Forbes & Company, Bond & Goodwin and others were
operating under the same agreement that we were.
Q. What was your connection with the United Founders Corporation? A. We were
the distributing, buying and selling organization for all securities of the American Founders
group in which United Founders was included ...
Q. So that you were buying that stock at 72ys and purporting to represent customers
under a buying order to whom you were charging $74? A. Yes, sir.
Q. You charged no commission to the customer whom you claim you were represent-
ing in this case, did you? A. None whatever.
Q. And your profit was represented by the difference in the price that you paid for
these securities and the amount that you received from your customers generally? A. Yes,
sir . ..
4. The matter is fully discussed in Bates and Douglas, Secondary Distribution of Securi-
ties-Problems Suggested by Kinney v. Glenny (1932) 41 YAL.E L. J. 949, 951-953, 980-985.
5. Note 3, supra.
6. Note 17, infra.
7. Note 3, supra.
8. Ibid.
9. The confirmation read:
We are pleased, to confirm sale to you of:
25 shs. United Founders Corp. Common 74 1850
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12, Record, 136.
10. Record, 65, 66, 83.
11. Note 18, infra.
12. Note 3, supra.
13. Ibid.
14. Record, 59. See note 54, infra.
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saling house.' (10) It did not call for payment until delivery of the
stock was tendered.
16
Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever that defendant thought
plaintiff was acting as agent rather than as dealer. Plaintiff had adver-
tised locally that it was acting as distributor for Founders General Cor-
poration,' 7 and, according to defendants, they knew at the time the order
was placed that plaintiff was seeking to distribute an allotment of United
Founders shares.' It is therefore surprising both to find the trial court
15. Note 3, supra.
16. Record, 68, 69, 87, 88. The fact that plaintiff did not carry an inventory would
not itself make him out to be a dealer. As is pointed out hereafter that fact alone is con-
sistent with either an agent or a dealer relationship.
17. Record, 27. Plaintiff's witness, Ernest E. Kellogg, Cross.
Q. Did you ever see any of the advertising your firm did in the papers about that
time? A. I don't remember any specifically.
Q. Will you deny they advertised they were the general representatives and distributors
of the American Founders group, including the United Founders stock in this section?
A. That is a fact.
18. Record, 81, 82, 89, 90. Defendant's witness, Maurice Weinberg, Direct.
Q. Just tell us what you remember he [plaintiff's salesman, Kellogg] said to you at
that time. A. He came into my store and said he had an allotment of some United
Founders and wanted to sell me some ....
Q. What else did he say? A. He suggested that I had some International securities
and some other stock that he had sold me, and suggested that I sell them and buy United
Founders from him....
Q. What, if anything, did he say about the price of the United Founders? A. Well, it
was selling at 74y2 and he said he could sell to me at 74 that day.
Q. What did you say? A. I told him if he could dispose, sell my other stocks I would
buy the 25 shares of the United Founders from him.
Q. What did you next hear regarding the situation? A. I got a confirmation that
they had sold me 25 shares of United Founders.
Cross
Q. But you knew that confirmation which they sent you . . . meant that they were
telling you that they had purchased for your account 25 shares of United Founders? A. Did
not.
Q. You didn't know that is what it meant? A. No, sir; it didn't mean that.
Q. What did it mean to you? A. It meant they had sold me 25 shares of United
Founders.
The version given by plaintiff's witness, Ernest E. Kellogg, was:
Direct
Q. What did you say to them [Weinbergs] and what did be say to you? . . . A. I
suggested that they sell the odd lot of preferred stocks or odd lot securities that they
had in this particular group and invest it in the United Founders....
Q. What did Maurice [Weinberg] say to you when you suggested that? A. He asked
me the price of the United Founders at that time.
Q. What did you tell him? A. I said it was selling around 74. ...
Q. What did he say? A. He said to me "Sell the odd lot securities and buy 25 shares
of United Founders."
Cross
Q. Wasn't it a fact that you said that your firm . . . had an allotment or a position
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submitting the case to the jury and the appellate courts affirming the
judgment entered on the verdict.
II
It is no surprise, however, that counsel for a dealer would first en-
deavor to establish his case on an agency theory. There are distinct
procedural and substantive law advantages in being able to sue as agent
rather than as dealer. In the first place, it has been quite uniformly
held that shares of stock fall within the statute of frauds section of the
Uniform Sales Act, 9 being included in the words "goods or choses in
action." 203 Consequently, where the "broker" acts as dealer, the trans-
action is a contract of sale within the statute,2 ' and enforceable only
in a block of United Founders and could sell it to him at 74, which would be about
one-half a point under the ordinary market? A. No.
Q. Do you deny that you said anything of that kind? A. I do. I don't remember it.
Q. That is, you don't remember saying it? A. I don't remember saying anything of
that kind. Record 23, 24, 26.
19. Uza mOna SALts AcT § 4.
20. Illinois-Indiana Fair Association v. Phillips, 328 Ill. 368, 159 N. E. 815 (1927);
Guppy v. Moltrup, 281 Pa. 343, 126 Atl. 766 (1924); Davis Laundry & Cleaning Co. v.
Whitmore, 92 Ohio St. 44, 110 N. E. 518 (1915); De Nunzio v. De Nunzio, 90 Conn. 342,
97 AUt. 323 (1916).
21. F. C. Adams, Inc. v. Frank H. Thayer & a. Ex'rs., 85 N. H. 177, 155 Atl. 687 (1931),
af'd., 156 Atl. 697 (N. H. 1931); Farr v. Fratus, 277 Mass. 346, 178 N. E. 657 (1931);
see Pascal v. Hess, 7 N. J. Misc. 884, 885, 147 Atl. 472, ibid. (Sup. Ct. 1929); and cf.
Kellner v. Kener, 104 Misc. 254, 171 N. Y. Supp. 814 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Mattingly v. Pennie,
105 Cal. 514, 39 Pac. 200 (1895); Tompkins v. Sheehan, 158 N. Y. 617, 53 N. E. 502
(1899).
The court in F. C. Adams, Inc. v. Frank H. Thayer & a. Ex'rs., supra, said by way of
dictum, at 182-183, 155 Atl. at 690-691:
"Unless specially agreed otherwise, the common understanding is that in the ordinary
transaction a broker buying securities for a customer does not buy them as the latter's
agent. The 5customer is not regarded as the broker's undisclosed principal who may be
held by the seller to answer'for any liability of the broker in making the purchase. The
seller and the customer have no relations with each other, and the broker deals inde-
pendently with each. Both the customer and the seller look only to the broker in their
respective undertakings with him. While the seller expects that the broker is buying
for a customer, he does not count on any liability of the customer as the broker's prin-
cipal. This at least is believed to be the generally accepted view when the customer is
undisclosed, although the seller knows or believes that the broker is buying for a customer.
Special terms in the customer's engagement of the broker may alter the relationship. But,
as the business of buying and selling securities is ordinarily conducted, the broker would
seem to be an independent contractor rather than an agent. It is true that he renders
a service and carries out an order. But this is not the test. The broker is his own master
in carrying out "the order, and the customer has no control of its execution. Where control
is not given, no agency is created.
"If it is not common knowledge that this is the view taken of such transactions in the
business world, and if such view may seem a departure from the law as generally under-
stood to prevail, yet the theory that the customer here was the undisclosed principal of
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when its requirements are satisfied. 2  And, although a confirmation
slip may be a sufficient memorandum of the contract to satisfy the
statute, where the confirmation slip does not conform to the contract
a court of equity has no power to reform it so as to make the contract
enforceable.2" But where one acts as agent for the customer the statute
of frauds provision of the Sales Act is inapplicable to the order given
by the latter, 2 4 since there was no sale from the agent to the customer.
Secondly, where the dealer is suing as vendor for damages or for the
price of the securities he is confronted with the usual rules of the law
of sales. In a majority of the few jurisdictions which have passed upon
this point, stocks are held to come within the Sales Act,' although
"things in action" are excluded from the category of "goods." 0 The
measure of recovery against the vendee for refusal to accelit delivery
of the stock might not be the contract price but rather damages com-
puted by the difference between the contract price and the market price
at the time of delivery.27  In the absence of evidence of such difference
the recovery would be limited to nominal damages.281 To recover the
the broker in the latter's purchases of the stock may not be upheld. The broker's purchases
were at prices other than the customer's orders, and its contracts to buy were not the
same as those of the customer to buy. The sellers might not claim a sale to the customer.
No agency existed to charge the customer to meet the broker's obligations in its purchases.
They were transactions independent of the customer's orders, although made in reliance
upon the orders. They were the broker's own business. As one of the plaintiff's witnesses
testified, the broker might dispose of his purchases as he saw fit until he applied them to
the acceptance of the orders."
22. Cohen v. Paine, Webber & Co., 113 Conn. 295, 155 AUt. 71 (1931) (part payment);
Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481 (1893); Porter v. Wormser, 94 N. Y. 431- (1884) (bonds;
ratification and failure to plead).
23. Freedman & Co., Inc. v. Newman, 255 N. Y. 340, 174 N. E. 703 (1931).
24. Rogers v. Gould, 6 Hun. 229 (N. Y. 1S75); Picard v. Beers, 195 Mass. 419, 81
N. E. 246 (1907); Sutro v. Jacobson, 96 N. J. L. 555, 115 Atl. 79 (1921); Rodman v.
Weinberger, 81 N. J. L. 441, 79 AtI. 338 (1911); Bibb v. Allen, supra note 22; Libaire v.
Feinstein, 133 Misc. 27, 213 N. Y. Supp. 3 (N. Y. City Ct. 1928).
25. Wills v. Investors Bankstocks Corp., 257 N. Y. 451, 178 N. E. 755 (1931); Postel
v. Hagist, 251 Ill. App. 454 (1928); Orr v. Keith, 245 Mass. 35, 139 N. E. 508 (1923);
Crichfield-Loeffler, Inc. v. Taverna, 4 N. J. Misc. 310, 132 AtI. 494 (Sup. Ct. 1926);
Friedman v. Bachmann, 234 App. Div. 267, 254 N. Y. Supp. 689 (1st Dep't 1932); Corwin
v. Grays Harbor Washingtonian, Inc., 151 Wash. 585, 276 Pac. 902 (1929); id., 159 Wash.
92, 292 Pac. 412 (1930). Contra: Henderson v. Plymouth Oil Co., 13 F. (2d) 932
(W. D. Pa. 1926); Millard v. Green, 94 Conn. 597, 110 Atl. 177 (1920); Smith v. Lingel-
bach, 177 Wis. 170, 187 N. W. 1007 (1922); Morris F. Fox & Co. v. Lisman, 208 Wis. 1,
240 N. W. 809 (1932) (bonds).
26. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 76 (1). And see the dissent of Crane, J., in Wills v. Investors
Bankstocks Corp., supra note 25, at 458-59, 178 N. E. at 757: "The Personal Property
Law applies to the buying and selling of commodities, things that can be manually deliv-
ered. Stock is a chose in action, a mere fractional interest in the capital of a corporation."




contract price would require satisfaction of the conditions of Section 63
of the Sales Act, -9 which restricts recovery to instances where the prop-
erty in the stock had passed to the buyer, or where the price was pay-
able on a day certain, irrespective of delivery or of transfer of title, or
where the stock could not readily be resold for a reasonable price, though
property in the stock had not passed."
If, however, the "broker" is acting as an agent of the customer, the
problem of whether there is sufficient passing of the title to the shares
to warrant a suit for the price arises in a somewhat different way. On
acquisition of the shares by the agent the title is said to pass to the
customer directly, the "broker" holding the shares as pledgee for the
amount of his advances." The difference is marked in case of bankruptcy
of the "broker." Where he was acting as dealer the customers are his
general creditors for all advances made unless title "had passed to the
buyers on proper allocation by the seller" to his contracts of sale.2 The
mere fact that the dealer has such stock in his possession is not sufficient
29. Friedman v. Bachmann, supra note 25. And where the customer sues the dealer
on the contract to sell, the ordinary rules as to damages or specific performance would be
applicable. See UmvoaPm SALS ACT §§ 66, 67, 68; Smurr v. Kaman, 301 Ill. 179, 133
N. E. 715 (1921) ("If the shares are readily obtainable in the open market specific per-
formance will not be decreed, but if the shares have no market rating and cannot easily
be obtained elsewhere, specific performance will be granted."); Morgan v. Bartlett, 75
W. Va. 293, 83 S. E. 1001 (1914). See cases collected in Note (1923) 22 A. L. R. 1032.
30. Corwin v. Grays Harbor Washingtonian, Inc., supra note 25; Agar v. Orda, 144
Misc. 149, 258 N. Y. Supp. 274 (Sup. Ct. 1932). When the Sales Act is held to be inap-
plicable to sales of stock, the rights of the parties would be determined in accordance with
the general principles of law governing the performance of contracts. Thus it has been
held that where there has been no repudiation of the contract by the buyer prior to the
time when plaintiff tendered the stock, the plaintiff, on tender and refusal of the buyer
to accept and pay, has a choice (1) to hold the stock for the benefit of the buyer and
sue for the price; (2) to elect to sell the stock and recover the difference between the selling
price and the contract price; or (3) to keep the stock and recover the difference between
the contract price and the market price at the time of the breach and at the time and
place of delivery. Smith v. Lingelbach, supra note 25. Cf. Agar v. Orda, supra.
31. Le Mfarchant v. Moore, 150 N. Y. 209, 44 N. E. 770 (1896); Markham v. Jaudon,
41 N. Y. 235 (1869); Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. 874 (1893); Richardson
v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365 (1908); Blankenhorn-Hunter-Dublin Co. v. Thayer, 199 Cal. 90,
247 Pac. 1088 (1926). For the contrary view in Massachusetts as respects marginal trans-
actions, see Papadopulos v. Bright, 264 Mass. 42, 47, 161 N. E. 799, 801 (1928); Crehan v.
Megargel, 235 Mass. 279, 126 N. E. 477 (1920); MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND
STOCK ExctANG-s (1931) § 41. On outright purchases by the customer through the
"broker" as agent the stock becomes the property of the customer when acquired by the
"broker" even in Massachusetts. Gifford v. Eastman, 251 Mass. 520, 146 N. E. 773 (1925).
Even though the contract is one of sale, after the dealer has appropriated certificates to
the contract he holds them as pledgee [Schofield v. Jackson, 99 Conn. 515, 122 Atl. 98
(1923)] or, as stated by some courts, as bailee [see In re Banker's Capital Corp., 51 F.
(2d) 737 (S. D. N. Y. 1931)] subject to a lien for the purchase price.
32. In re Banker's Capital Corp., supra note 31.
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in the absence of definite allocation to the sales contracts. 3  If, how-
ever, the "broker" was acting as agent, specific allocation of the stock
to orders is not necessary, the customers of that class sharing as tenants
in common under the pledgor-pledgee relationship.34
Analogous problems are raised where the dealer, w ith money advanced
by the customer, purchases stock pursuant to the customer's order and
pledges the stock for a personal loan. The mere acquisition of the
stock by the dealer has been held insufficient to appropriate the par-
ticular stock to the customer so as to vest title in him.' Moreover, if
the "broker" is acting as a dealer or vendor and the contract of sale
does not provide otherwise, he must deliver or tender delivery to the
customer. But where he is acting as agent no such tender is necessary,
the customer's only defense being a counterclaim for any damages suf-
fered. 6 In case he was selling stock to the customer in the manner of a
merchant, the delay in the delivery or tender of the certificates might
be fatal. The general principle is that when no time for performance is
set, the duty is to perform within a reasonable time. 37  Or when the
contract contemplated delivery in a specified time, failure to deliver
by that time bars an action for the price. 8
33. In re Banker's Capital Corp., supra note 31, on analogy to rules governing con-
tracts for sale of other personalty. Marshall v. Roettinger, 294 Fed. 158 (C. C. A. 6th,
1923). Cf. Wills v. Investors Bankstocks Corp., supra note 25.
34. Duel v. Hollins, 241 U. S. 523 (1916); Skiff v. Stoddard; Le Marchant v. Moore,
both supra note 31.
35. Coolidge v. Old Colony Trust Co.,. 259 Mass. 515, 156 N. E. 701 (1927).
On the lien of a vendor (dealer) as compared with the lien of a pledgee, see Leahy v. Lob-
dell, Farwell & Co., 80 Fed. 665 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897); Markham v. Jaudon, supra note 31.
Where the contract is one of sale the dealer is not liable in conversion for disposition of
the stock where, as in case of an instalment sale, title had not passed to the customer.
Sackville v. Wimer, 76 Colo. 519, 233 Pac. 152 (1925); Maw v. Fay, 248 Mass. 426,
143 N. E. 315 (1924).
Cf. The liability for conversion of a "broker" who acts as agent. Mayer v. Monzo,
221 N. Y. 442, 117 N. E. 948 (1917); Content v. Banner, 184 N. Y. 121, 76 N. E. 913
(1906); MEYER, op. cit. supra note 31, § 136. An analogy is the customer's action for
conversion on a wrongful repledge. Douglas v. Carpenter, 17 App. Div. 329, 45 N. Y.
Supp. 219 (1st Dep't 1897); In re Salmon Weed & Co., Inc., 53 F. (2d) 335 (C. C. A. 2d,
1931).
36. Community National Corp. v. Kable, 233 App. Div. 334, 252 N. Y. Supp. 804 (4th
Dep't 1931).
37. Orr v. Keith, supra note 25, the court saying at 39, 139 N. E. at 510: "If the con-
tract was to sell and deliver property so fluctuating in value as shares of stock, the period
of six months from July, 1921, to the beginning of the year 1922 was an unreasonable time
for performance . . ." See Union Corp. Ltd. v. Charrington, 19 T. L. R. 129 (1902).
"Although what is a reasonable time is ordinarily a question of fact, it may be dealt
with by the court as a question of law, when there is no room for dispute." Orr v. Keith,
supra.




Some jurisdictions, including New York, have held that where the
"broker" acts as agent the customer cannot rescind the transaction against
him, the action of rescission lying only against the seller. 9 Consistently
therewith it has been held that the only remedy by the customer against
the "broker" would be for damages caused by the delay.40 Yet since he
was acting in the capacity of an agent, the "broker's" obligation (arising
from the bilateral contract between him and the customer) is limited
to the use of reasonable care and diligence in filling the order and ob-
taining the delivery of the certificates.4" Hence if he can show that the
belated delivery was due to no negligence of his, but to the delay of the
transfer agent, the customer is not excused from performance. 42  In
case he was acting as dealer, however, in order to maintain an action he
would need tender delivery to the customer within the time stated or
within a reasonable time, the negligence or delay of a transfer agent
being no excuse for his belated performance.4"
Enough has been said to indicate that there are substantial reasons
why a stock "broker" who acts as a dealer would prefer to have a court or
jury find that he acted as agent. The reasons for the preference in the
Howell case might well have been the following. There was a delay in
delivery of about three months.4   Although the jury found that this
delay was not due to the negligence of plaintiff,' yet if plaintiff had sued
39. Connelly v. Glenny, 233 App. Div. 198, 251 N. Y. Supp. 288 (4th Dep't 1931);
Lund v. Keeler, 203 Wis. 458, 233 N. W. 769 (1931). For review of authorities see Bates
and Douglas, supra note 4, at 994 et seq.
40. Lund v. Keeler, supra note 39. Others have held, however, that if the "broker"
acting as agent fails to deliver within a reasonable time, the customer is not liable for
refusing to accept delivery. Goldsmith, Myer & Lobdell, Inc. v. Adler, 108 N. J. L. 312,
156 At]. 642 (1931) (This case involved, however, an order for stock of United Founders
as in the Howell case. Whether the broker was acting as a dealer does not appear. Nor
are inferences permissible from the opinion); Howe, Snow, Corrigan & Bertles v. Vander
Veen, 223 Mich. 572, 194 N. W. 508 (1923) (broker bought after customer countermanded).
See cases collected in Note (1932) 77 A. L. R. 308. The terms of the contract between
customer and "broker" as to method of execution of the order and tender to the customer
are controlling. Drake-Jones Co. v. Drogseth, 246 N. W. 664 (Minn. 1933).
41. Bates and Douglas, supra note 4, at 964 et seq.
42. Eddy v. Schiebel, 112 Conn. 248, 152 Atl. 66 (1930), holding the broker not liable
for the delay of the transfer agent in transferring the shares to the customer where the
broker himself was not negligent.
43. See cases supra notes 37, 38. An agent-customer relationship as contrasted to a
dealer-customer relationship would not permit the customer to repudiate the order after
execution by the "broker" so as to be relieved from liability to the "broker" for the price.
See Lloyd v. Silvers, 274 S. W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Matousek v. Bank of Europe
Trust Co., 234 App. Div. 328, 255 N. Y. Supp. 150 (1st Dep't 1932).
44. Defendants' order was placed with plaintiff Sept. 11, 1929. Record, 22 et seq.
Delivery was tendered at defendants' bank with draft attached Dec. 10, 1929. Defendants
refused payment. Record, 68, 69.
45. The trial court charged that "plaintiff Was not responsible . . .if it acted as broker
for any delay in the delivery of this stock unless that delay was due to some want of
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as dealer (or vendor) it seems likely that this delay would have been
fatal.46 Furthermore, in an action as dealer for the price, plaintiff would
have been confronted with the defense that defendants repudiated prior
to appropriation of shares to the contract.
47
There are, to be sure, risks in suing as agent not inherent in a suit
as dealer. Thus an agent who sells his "own" stock to his principal (the
customer) without full disclosure may not enforce the contract against
the principal. Or, in the case of executed transactions, he may be lia-
ble to the customer in rescission, even though the price was fair and the
bargain as good or better than could have been obtained elsewhere." '
As stated by the New York Court of Appeals in Taussig v. Hart: 49
" . the law does not permit an agent employed to purchase, to buy of
himself. It is no answer that the intention was honest and that the brokers
did better for their principal by selling him their own stock than they could
have done by going into the open market. The rule is inflexible, and although
its violation in the particular case caused no damage to the principal, he can-
not be compelled to adopt the purchase."
Since the plaintiff in the Howell case sued as agent of the customer,
it would seem that he brought himself within this rule. But without
mentioning the Taussig case or discussing the point, the Court of Appeals
held otherwise. Previous, however, to the Howell suit, the court had
decided the case of Kinney v. Glenny.6° In that case a customer sued
his "brokers" to rescind an agreement for the purchase of shares of
stock, claiming that they had acted as his agents. A regular brokerage
commission had been charged the customer, and while the confirmation
slip read "sale to you," the customer had had no actual knowledge that
anything other than a normal "brokerage" transaction was involved.
care on its part . . ." Record, 119. One bit of evidence that plaintiff was negligent (even
assuming it was acting as agent) was not emphasized by the defense. It appeared (Rec-
ord, 74-78) that plaintiff lumped defendants' order with those of other customers and did
not request the transfer agent to send a certificate in the denomination of 25 shares to
fill the defendants' order. Consequently the transfer agent returned certificates of larger
denominations which had to be returned to be broken down.
46. See cases supra notes 37, 38.
47. Defendants testified they repudiated Oct. 15, 1929. Record, 86, 87. This was in
dispute. Record, 100, 101. Counterbalancing this matter, it appeared from plaintiff's
evidence that defendants exercised their rights on the stock purchased and thus ratified
the transaction. Record, 90 et seq. Defendants disclaimed this fact. Record, 93, 94.
This controverted issue of fact was not submitted to the jury. By suing as agent plaintiff
avoided the uncertainty of a jury on these two points. See cases supra note 43.
48. See Bates and Douglas, supra note 4, at 964 et seq., for an extended review of the
cases.
49. 58 N. Y. 425, 428 (1874).
50. 257 N. Y. 560, 178 N. E. 795 (1931), aff'g 231 App. Div. 311, 247 N. Y. Supp. 119
(1st Dep't 1931). The case is discussed in Bates and Douglas, supra note 4.
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But measured by the established standards of the security business,
the "brokers" had in fact acted as dealers. Upon the understanding
that they would pay the difference if the shares came back on the open
market within sixty days, they had acquired the securities from a New
York house at a price less than that charged the customer. The cus-
tomer held the shares more than sixty days and on discovering the facts
brought his action. The court, refusing to conclude that the defendants
had sold plaintiff their "own" shares, dismissed the suit on the ground
that plaintiff's only remedy against defendants was an action to re-
cover the undisclosed profits. Thus a dealer who does not carry an
inventory, who leads his customer to believe that he is acting as an
agent and who in fact obtains an agent's commission in addition to his
dealer's profit, may protect himself against rescission by defending on
the ground that he acted as agent. By virtue of his non-disclosure he
receives protection normally not accorded fiduciaries.
So it may be that the absence of an inventory in the Howell case is
the differentiating factor between that case and Taussig v. Hart. But
the reasons for drawing such a distinction are by no means obvious.
To be sure, in the latter case the agent at the time of sale "owned" the
stock in the sense that he had possession of the certificates for which he
had paid the price. In the Howell case plaintiff was not carrying this
stock in its portfolio. But it had an arrangement with Founders Gen-
eral whereby it agreed to distribute the stock. What the details of that
arrangement were does not appear.0 ' If it definitely committed plaintiff
to take a specified quantity of shares, the case is scarcely different from
the Taussig case. If plaintiff merely had an option to acquire the shares,
the difference would not be basic; nor would it be even though Founders
General were under no duty to plaintiff to deliver any shares. The fea-
ture common to all those situations is the existence on the "broker's"
part of an interest adverse to that of his customery- and inconsistent
51. Plaintiff's witness, Walter S. Wiggin, Re-Cross, Record, 57.
Q. Isn't it a fact .. .that you had a private arrangement with the Founders General
Corporation for assisting them in distributing the United Founders stock? A. We did
have.
Q. And that in connection with that arrangement they would allot to you or protect
you to enable you to make sales of that stock at a price that would not fluctuate to
such an extent that you would not have protection on the fixed value, isn't that the fact?
A. They would advise us of the market opening price of the day. We were to bill at
that market price. No excess of it. And during the day if there was any change of price
they notified us by wire or 'phone.
Q. That is, you started in each day with a quotation from them as to the price at
which you could sell United Founders that particular day out of the stock they were
going to distribute. A. At that market price in Boston.
52. See extended analysis of this point in Bates and Douglas, supra note 4. As stated
in F. C. Adams, Inc. v. Frank H. Thayer & a. Ex'rs., supra note 21, where the dealer
was acquiring stock from outside sources, not selling from his inventory: "It was no
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with the fiduciary-agency relationship in which he claims to have acted.
His dominant motive is profit to himself realized by buying as low as
possible and selling to his customer as high as possible. Certainly no
rational distinction can be drawn between a merchant who carries an
inventory and one who does not. Retail and wholesale merchants in
other lines frequently have insufficient merchandise on hand to fill orders
of customers. Yet when they buy a supply sufficient to fill the orders
they do not thereby act as agents for their customers. Thus in the
Howell case although the plaintiff, who asserted rights of an agent,
did not carry an inventory, he acted as a merchant and should be
limited by the same rules as the plaintiff in Taussig v. Hart.
In such event the only factor which would protect him in his action
would be full disclosure that he was acting as dealer or merchant. From
the testimony of defendants it seems clear that full disclosure was
madeP3 To be sure, the profit plaintiff hoped to make in the transac-
tion was not disclosed. 4 But it would be the exception, not the rule,
for vendors to disclose to their vendees the exact profit which they ex-
pected to realize. If a "broker" revealed that he was acting as dealer,
that should suffice. But the Court of Appeals after accepting the verdict
that plaintiff acted as agent concluded that deduction of plaintiff's profit
of 1y per cent was proper. It said: I
"Due to plaintiff's undisclosed relationship with the owner of the stock, noth-
ing except the actual purchase price of the stock can be recovered from de-
fendants. No profit or commission can be allowed."
As authority for this proposition the court cited Kinney v. Glenny. 0
Thus the Howell case also assumes paradoxical aspects. A jury is
allowed to find that a "broker," who by all standards of the business
acted as dealer, acted as agent. Having been classified as agent, the
part of the order that the broker should make effort to obtain a better price. . . .If the
plaintiff [dealer] obtained the stock, it did not concern the decedent how much it paid
for it. . . .The situation thus differed from the ordinary case in which it is the broker's
duty to buy for the customer and to obtain the stock as cheaply as possible and not above
such limit of price as the customer may set. . . .The plaintiff acted for itself and not for
the decedent. Having an offer for the stock, it could make a profit if it could obtain
the stock at a price below the offer, and this it sought to do." 85 N. H. at 181-182, 155
Atl. at 690.
53. See note 18, supra.
54. Record, note 18, p. 59. Plaintiff's witness, Walter S. Wiggin, Re-Cross.
Q. You never told your customers what concession you were getting, did you? A. Why
should we? They bought at the same price they could buy in the open market and they
could have sold at the same price they bought.
Q. In any event you did not tell the customers your concessions or whatever benefit
you were deriving out of the transaction on your sales of the United Founders, did
you? A. We did not.
55. Supra note 1, at 253, 183 N. E. at 379.
56. Suprca Zote 50.
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"broker" is in the first place allowed to assert rights on a contract even
though he had an interest adverse to that of his customer which, accord-
Ing to the court, he did not disclose. In the second place, having been
found to be an agent the "broker" is deprived of his profit though in
fact he was a dealer and the customer admitted that he knew he was
so acting. And in the third place, by being classified as agent contrary
to fact he avoids being put to the defense which a dealer normally must
sustain.
The result of the Howell and Kinney cases may be either or both of
the following legal propositions:
(1) A "broker" who by all standards of the security business is a
dealer may nevertheless on the one hand assert rights or claim defenses
peculiar to an agent provided he does not carry an inventory and, on
the other, avoid the rule which forbids an agent to sell his "own" 51
stock even though he solicits orders for particular securities and fills
them in the manner of a security merchant without an inventory.
(2) The question of whether or not a "broker" acted as agent or
dealer is a question of fact.
In addition the Howell case may mean that even though the customer
is not misled by the nature of the transaction, if a jury calls a dealer
an agent he is deprived of his profit. The two cases have come perilously
close to establishing as a matter of law the first proposition stated above.
The reasons for the position of the New York courts on that proposition
may well be due to a failure to treat the second proposition in a dis-
criminating manner.
III
It is undoubtedly true that in one sense the question of whether or
not a "broker" acted as agent or dealer is a question of fact. What
the "broker" did may be controverted or in dispute. The determination
of that question certainly is for the jury. But after it is ascertained
what the "broker" did-his representations to the customer, the type
of confirmation used, where and how he obtained the securities, who
paid his commission-the legal consequences should remain for the
court. Or to put it another way, if the issue is sent to the jury, it should
be submitted under precise instructions as to what specific earmarks will
constitute a "broker" a dealer on the one hand or an agent on the other.
. The law is replete with analogies. Thus in a case involving the
liability of the defendant to creditors on the ground that he was a
57. See Bates and Douglas, supra note 4. The coure in the Kinney case, after holding
that the dealer was not liable, indicated that if any one was liable it was the seller from
whom the dealer received the stock. Accordingly plaintiff sued Lisman & Co. The com-




partner in the business, the jury is allowed to ascertain what were the
terms of his contract with his alleged co-partners."s But as has been
stated, "whether a partnership existed or not is an inference of law
from the established facts . . ." r9 If "the extrinsic facts and the infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom are free from dispute" the question of
construction is "exclusively a question for the court." 'o
Similarly, in cases where the injury to plaintiff has been caused by
one whom defendant calls an independent contractor but whom plain-
tiff calls a servant or agent of defendant, the appellate courts have
worked out formulae defining in general these concepts. The distribu-
tion of powers between the court and the jury is well stated by the
New York Court of Appeals: "
"As here, the answer may depend on a written contract. In the absence of
technical phrases whose meaning is obscure, or of latent ambiguities making
the subject-matter of the contract doubtful, the court must construe it.
(Brady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y. 147.) Again there may be an express oral con-
tract. This too the court should construe. Or the existence of an oral contract
may be denied, or its terms disputed. If so it is for the jury to pass upon its
existence and provisions and under proper instruction to give effect to it.
(Patten v. Pancoast, 109 N. Y. 625.) Or the contract, oral or written, may
be ambiguous. Its construction may depend upon the intent of the parties in
turn dependent on disputed facts. Then it becomes the duty of the jury again
under proper instrhctions to determine this intent. Or there may be no ex-
press contract. One is to be implied from contradictory or disputed circum-
stances. Once more the jury must decide what was the actual relationship."
The instructions in the Howell case satisfied only in a formal way the
tests of a dealer or agent relationship. The relevant portions of the
charge were: 62
"The plaintiff claims that as a result of that conversation [between Kellogg
and Weinberg] it received an order to purchase 25 shares of this stock. The
defendants claim as a result of that conversation that the plaintiff sold them
25 shares of this stock.
"That presents, gentlemen of the jury, a question of fact for you to deter-
mine. Of course, you are not limited solely to that conversation in determin-
ing whether or not this was a mere sale or whether brokerage services were
involved, but you have a right to take into consideration all other testimony,
58. See Rider v. Hammell, 63 Kan. 733, 66 Pac. 1026 (1901); James Bailey Co. v.
Darling, 119 Me. 326, 111 Atl. 410 (1920); T. R. Foley Co. v. McKinley, 114 Minn. 271,
131 N. W. 316 (1911); Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276 (1872); Mill Factors Corp. v.
Margolies, 210 App. Div. 739, 206 N. Y. Supp. 434 (1st Dep't 1924).
59. James Bailey Co. v. Darling, supra note 58, at 328, 111 Atl. at 411.
60. T. R. Foley Co. v. McKinley, supra note 58, at 274, 131 N. W. at 318.




both oral and written, which you accept as credible and which bears upon
that proposition.
"A broker, to define the term in very simple language, is an agent employed
to purchase or sell for another....
"Now, you have the definition of a broker, you have the testimony of
Kellogg, you have the testimony of Maurice Weinberg, you have the other
details, both oral and written, which have been given in evidence with relation
to this transaction. Determine, gentlemen of the jury, from that testimony
whether this transaction was a sale, or whether it involved the brokerage
services of the plaintiff. If you find that it was a sale, that is, if the plaintiff
was not purchasing something for the defendant, but was selling them stock
as the agent of another concern, then your verdict must be one of no cause
of action . . . That is the primary proposition involved. Determine that first.
Was the plaintiff a broker in this transaction, or was he simply the agent of
the owner of this stock?"
Certainly, this charge does not reveal even the gross differences in
fact between a stock "broker" acting as agent on the one hand and as
dealer on the other. It seems unlikely that the jury would supply the
discrimination which the trial court failed to furnish. The distinctions
which the court states as respects agency and sale, buried as they are in
a long charge, would tend to blur rather than differentiate the two rela-
tionships. It is difficult to believe other than that a jury under such
a charge would be likely to classify as an agent any dealer who was
authorized by a customer to place an order for purchase, and who in
a popular sense rendered "brokerage services" to the customer.
The distinctions between dealer and agent have been only generally
articulated by the courts. 3 Nevertheless, recent cases have recognized
more and more the distinguishing characteristics of these two relation-
ships. The New York Court of Appeals has on occasion adverted to
them. 4 Judge Merrill has well stated them as follows:
"Ordinarily stockbrokers are agents working for a commission. They at-
tend to the purchase and sale of stocks or shares or other securities for and
on behalf of clients. They are employed to buy and sell shares of stock of
incorporated companies by their principals. It cannot be said that a person
who buys for himself and sells to another is acting as a stockbroker for that
other. Stockbrokers, on the other hand, do not transact business for them-
selves, but for others. Their employment is to buy or sell stocks, and they
receive compensation for their services. They act as agents of the persons
for whom the purchases or sales are made. Their interest in the transaction
is only to the extent of the commission which they are to receive. On the other
hand, stock dealers or jobbers are those who deal in stocks or shares. They
63. MEYER, op. cit. supra note 31, 1932 Supp. § 43a.




are persons who purchase or sell stocks, bonds or other securities on their own
account. The distinction between a stockbroker and a stock dealer is clear
and well defined. Having in mind the distinctive ftatures between stock-
brokers and stock dealers of jobbers, the record on this appeal shows that
Schofield & Co. were actually acting as dealers and not as brokers in relation
to the two transactions. In the first place, Schofield & Co.'s letterhead repre-
sented them to be specialists in 'investment securities.' Secondly, the written
confirmation of sale from Schofield & Co. to plaintiff read: 'We are pleased
to confirm sale to you.' It did not read: 'We have this day sold or purchased
for your account and risk,' which would have been the natural wording of the
confirmation had Schofield & Co. been acting as the brokers for plaintiff. Fur-
thermore, the evidence shows that Schofield & Co. bought the ten shares of the
Equitable Trust Company stock from defendant at ninety-two dollars per share,
and on the same day sold the same stock to plaintiff at ninety-five dollars
per share; and that Schofield & Co. purchased of defendant twenty shares of
the Aetna Life stock at ninety-nine dollars a share, and the same day sold the
same stock to the plaintiff at one hundred and one dollars and fifty cents a
share. Nothing, it seems to me, could more clearly indicate the capacity in
which Schofield & Co. were acting, and that they were at the time, not the
agents of plaintiff, but were dealers in the securities which they sold to him.
There is no claim on the part of plaintiff that Schofield & Co. were to receive
any commissions whatever. Their compensation was -in the increased price
which they received from plaintiff for the two blocks of stock in question.
The form of confirmation used by Schofield & Co., showing a profit to it of
three points on one stock and two and one-half points on the other, shows the
true relationship between said company and plaintiff." 65
Other courts have recognized the same distinctions and in 'general
have employed the following differentiating characteristics or earmarks
to distinguish the dealer from the agent.
(1) The form of the confirmation "sold to you" rather than "bought
for your account" is evidentiary of a dealer-customer relationship. 6
(2) The fact that the customer is not charged any commission is
likewise evidence that the "broker" acted as dealer.
6T
65. Wills v. Investors Bankstocks Corp., 232 App. Div. 197, 202-203, 249 N. Y. Supp.
705, 711-712 (1st Dep't 1931) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 257 N. Y. 451, 173 N. E. 755
(1931).
66. Farr v. Fratus, supra note 21; Hornblower v. James, 155 AtI. 568 (R. I. 1931);
McNulty v. Whitney, 273 Mass. 494, 174 N. E. 121 (1930); Williams v. Bolling, 13S
Va. 244, 121 S. E. 270 (1923). See MmER, op. cit. supra note 31, 1932 Supp. § 43a. But
the receipt by the customer of a dealer's confirmation slip is not by itself notice to the
customer that the "broker" was acting as dealer. McNulty v. Whitney; Williams v.
Bolling, both supra. And see discussion in Bates and Douglas, supra note 4, at 985 et seq.
67. Trowbridge v. O'Neill, 243 Mich. 84, 219 N. W. 681 (1928); F. C. Adams, Inc. v.




(3) The "broker" when acting as dealer usually acquires the stock
at one price and transfers it to the customer at another.68
(4) If the "broker" is selling from his inventory he is acting as a
dealer.00
(5) He is nonetheless a dealer even though he had no inventory but
was acquiring securities for his customer from any of several sources
in the manner of any merchant.70 For a "broker" to sell from his own
inventory would establish that he acted as a dealer; but it is not true,
conversely, that the absence of an inventory makes him an agent. That
alone would not discriminate between an agent and a dealer, though it
would be evidence to be weighed along with other of the criteria men-
tioned.
A "broker," however, need not have all the foregoing characteristics
in order to be a dealer. For example, in the Kinney case the "broker"
took commissions from both parties. Nor does it mean that those
characteristics are the only ones differentiating a dealer from an agent.
Thus in the Kinney case the "broker" guaranteed to the seller that the
stock would not come back onto the market within sixty days, a con-
tract consistent only with a dealer relationship.
As stated above, it was clearly established in the Howell case that
68. State v. Schofield, 114 Conn. 456, 463, 159 AtI. 285, 288 (1932); F. C. Adams, Inc.
v. Frank H. Thayer & a. Ex'rs., supra note 21. See MEm, op. cit. supra note 31, 1932
Supp. § 43a; Gast v. Buckley, 23 Ky. L. 992, 64 S. W. 632 (1901); State v. Debenture
Guarantee & Loan Co., Ltd., 51 La. Ann. 1874, 1887 (1899).
69. McNulty v. Whitney, supra note 66, and cases cited and discussed in Bates and
Douglas, supra note 4. See Cohen v. Paine, Webber & Co., supra note 22.
70. Coolidge v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra note 35. ("If one of his customers wanted
one of the real estate stocks in which Burroughs specialized, he quoted a price ...
When his customer accepted the price quoted, Burroughs then went into the market and
bought the stock as cheap as he could and kept the difference.") ; State v. Schofield, supra
note 68 (defendant-"broker" was a member of a distributing group somewhat comparable
to plaintiff in the Howell case and was held to be acting as a dealer and not as an agent) ;
F. C. Adams, Inc. v. Frank H. Thayer & a. Ex'rs.; Farr v. Fratus, both supra note 21;
Agar v. Orda, supra note 30. And see Schofield v. Jackson, supra note 31 ("broker" was
under contract with the issuing corporation "to market an entire new issue" of stock).
Some transactions between dealer and customer may initially be nothing but an offer on
the part of the customer to buy from the dealer at a price named. For example, in F. C.
Adams, Inc. v. Frank H. Thayer & a. Ex'rs., supra note 21, at 181-2, 155 Atl. at 690, the
court said: "So far as appears, the plaintiff had no duty to obtain any stock at a price
it did not choose to pay. In substance, an offer was made to buy which the plaintiff
accepted when it thought it to be for its interest to do so. The situation thus differed
from the ordinary case in which it is the broker's duty to buy for the customer and to
obtain the stock as cheaply as possible and not above such limit of price s the customer
may set."
Of course the fact that the "broker" acting as agent assumed the position of principal
towards the buyers or sellers with whom he dealt does not make him a vendor or dealer
as respects his customer. American Cotton Mills v. Monier, 61 F. (2d) 852 (C. C. A. 4th,
1932); Bates and Douglas, supra note 4.
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plaintiff (1) was the local representative of a wholesaling house; (2)
sold the stock at as nearly a fixed price as would be possible in case of
stocks; (3) confirmed the transaction with a "sold to you" slip; (4)
ordered the stock from the wholesaler without advance payment or any
"margin" from defendants; (5) solicited the order for this particular
stock; (6) was bound by the prices and rules of the wholesaling house;
(7) charged defendants no commission; (8) made no disclosure to the
defendants of its profit; (9) received a dealer's discount from the whole-
saling house; and (10) did not call for payment until the stock was
tendered to defendants. Those facts being established beyond doubt
and defendants admitting they knew plaintiff acted as dealer, it would
seem that the correct procedure would have been to grant the motion
for non-suit. But if the case were going to the jury, it should have
been sent merely for the purpose of finding whether or not the evidence
supported the foregoing facts. Once those facts were established then
the question of whether or not plaintiff was dealer or agent became a
question of law for the court. As a question of law it is clear that plain-
tiff was a dealer.
From the viewpoint of procedure and trial court strategy the Howell
case appears to have the following significance. Defendants stood on
their motion for non-suit and did not except to the charge or submit
requests to charge describing in more detail the differentiating charac-
teristics of dealer and agent. Until counsel sharply differentiate the
legal and factual distinctions between dealer and agent, it may confi-
dently be expected that trial and appellate courts will continue to treat
these concepts in a blurred fashion.
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